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I. INTRODUCTION
Google is so ubiquitous that it has become a verb in common
parlance. Yet, it is -difficult to identify exactly what Google does.
Consider the following "one-liner" attempts at explaining what
Google's business might entail:
"Google's business model is based on advertising[.]"'
2
"Google's business model: video-search dominance."

"[T]he . . . process that is at the core of Google's business

3
model is... an opaque 'black box' that users cannot see into."

* Visiting Graduate Student, The London School of Economics and Political Science;
M.B.A. Candidate, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business; J.D., The John
Marshall Law School, Chicago, Illinois. Thanks to Amanda Klonsky for her friendship,
patience, and encouragement through my attempts to write and rewrite this Article. I am
very grateful to my friends and colleagues, Ashley Cox, Adrienne Detanico, Lauren Greenwood, Alfred K. Murray, II, and Benjamin Dee Winston, II, for our many debates on the
future of American privacy rights. Special thanks to Katheryn DeVelvis, a graduate student at the University of Chicago, for sharing her insightful work analyzing Google's early
business models. Elizabeth M. Schutte contributed invaluable comments and criticism
related to earlier drafts.
1. Douglas MacMillan, Testing for Tech Literacy, Bus. WK., (Oct. 28, 2008),
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/oct2008/tc20081027_279347.htm.
2.

Abbey Klaassen, YouTube Now Second Largest for Search, ADVERTISING AGE, Oct.

20, 2008.
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With a network of one million online advertisers 4 as of 2008versus Yahoo!'s 300,0005 and Microsoft's 75,0006-it would be easy
to label Google an advertising company, 7 essentially an online evolution of a traditional advertising business model. With Google's
acquisition of YouTube, one might instead label Google an online
media outlet. 8 With its obscure auction process 9 and various ad
pricing gimmicks, one could simply dismiss Google as yet another
dot-com company with a somewhat opaque series of short-term
strategies.
This Article presents a very different interpretation of Google's
business model and, by extension, its role in society. Google is not
a search company, nor is it a media outlet or an advertising firm.
Google instead occupies an impossibly important, inevitably disquieting place in the future global economy: Google prices and
monetizes the privacy rights of the world's citizens.10
Google is a market maker" in privacy, controlling the prices
(and, in parallel, the rate) at which society commoditizes this fun-

3. The Blind Eye to Privacy Law Arbitrage by Google - Broadly Threatens Respect for
Privacy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications & the Internet of the H.
Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 110th Cong. 11 (2008) (statement of Scott Cleland, Presiat
available
LLC),
Precursor
dent,
http://energycommerce.house.gov/images/stories/Documents/Hearings/PDF/TestimonyTl/l
10-ti-hrg.071708.Cleland-testimony.pdf.
4. Id. at 8.
5. Id.
6. Id. See also Adam Lashinsky, Why Can't Microsoft Make Money Online?, FORTUNE,
Nov. 28, 2008, available at http://money.cnn.com/2008/11/25/technology/MicrosoftGoogle-lashinsky.fortune/.
7. See Goddard v. Google, Inc., No. C 08-2738 JF, 2008 WL 4542792, at *2 (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 8, 2008) ("Google's revenue from its advertising programs was more than $5 billion in
the first quarter of 2008."). This makes Google, in terms of advertising revenues, substantially larger than top advertising agencies. By comparison, the French advertising firm
Publicis Groupe posted $1.59 billion in first-quarter 2008 revenue, while Interpublic posted
$1.49 billion in revenue in the same quarter. See Bradley Johnson, Interpublic Group of
Companies: 2007 Year in Review, ADVERTISING AGE, May 5, 2008.
8. Claudine Beaumont & Matt Warman, Britain's Hottest Internet Celebrities; YouTube Is Helping Home-Grown Talent to Find Fame Online and Beyond, DAILY TELEGRAPH,
Nov. 27, 2008.
9. Greg Lastowka, Google's Law, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 1327, 1339-40 (2008) (describing
automated auction mechanism powering Google's profitable AdWords operations).
10. Compare Google's corporate mission statement ("Google's mission is to organize the
world's information and make it universally accessible and useful."). See Thomas R. Eisenmann and Kerry Herman, Harvard Business School Case Study 9-806-105 "Google Inc."
at 1 (2006).
11. A market maker is a non-participant who sets both the bid and ask prices in, for
instance, a securities or commodities market. See, e.g., Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co.,
438 F.2d 1167, 1170 n.4 (2d Cir. 1970).
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damental1 2 right.
This Article describes, from a law-andeconomics perspective, the market in privacy and explains why
Google is the one firm that is ideally positioned to price privacy.
II. SETTING A PRICE FOR PRIVACY
It is difficult to pull a concrete "price regime" out of the privacy
ether of the Internet. This issue was spotted early in the legal
academic community but has not received much attention in business school circles. As Professor Solove has asked:
How much weight [or value] should our vague apprehensions
[concerning privacy] be given, especially considering the tremendous utility, profit, and efficiency of using [large] databases? The answer to this question depends upon how the
privacy problem of databases is conceptualized. Unfortunately, so far, the problem has not been adequately articulated. 13
The question of how much privacy should be available for enjoyment is an abstract, problematic one. Using a traditional economic model for comparison, it is difficult to know how much food
is in the sea, but it is relatively easy to price an individual fish in
the market. This per instance valuation was, and still is, at the
center of the market in privacy. While the value of privacy in the
abstract is difficult to ascertain, it is not difficult to find the price
at which an individual is willing to negotiate away his 4 privacy.
Before any pricing of privacy emerged, however, a market
evolved from a series of barter arrangements. An individual
might be willing to trade Web-surfing privacy for the ability to use
Google's search engine, to trade the privacy of her weekend vacation plans in exchange for use of Google Maps, or to disclose his
whereabouts for the convenience of using Google Maps on his
iPhone.
An interesting barter case worthy of brief discussion is that of
Integrated Media Measurement, Inc. ("IMMI"). 1 5 IMMI gives con-

sumers discounted special cellular telephones and free cellular
12. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding privacy is fundamental
right).
13. Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1395 (2001).
14. Throughout this Article, the author has alternated between masculine and feminine pronouns to refer to the abstract individual.
15. The company's Web site is http://www.immi.com.
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telephone service. In exchange, the special cellular telephones
listen in on 16 the daily lives of the consumers and report back to
IMMI what music, television, radio, Internet, and other media the
consumer is exposed to during the course of a day. Even after
having IMMI monitor their daily entertainment habits, 96% of
IMMI users decided to continue the service in exchange for free
cellular telephone service. 17 This high retention percentage suggests that users not only agreed to barter their privacy for services
initially but also were willing to continue to barter additional privacy for additional services on an ongoing basis.
III. THE FIRST GOOGLETRACT
It is not difficult to enter into a contract with Google in which
one trades a share of his or her privacy rights for access to
Google's services. Google's Terms of Service contract provides that
acceptance occurs:
(B) By actually using the Services. In this case, you understand and agree that Google will treat your use of the
Services as acceptance of the Terms from that point onwards.

7.2 You agree to the use of your data in accordance to Google's
8
privacy policies. 1
Indeed, anyone who has ever used Google has assented to
Google's Terms of Service contract. 19 To terminate the agreement,
the user must both notify Google in writing and discontinue use of
all Google services and software. 20 Yet, no reports exist of any users who have successfully severed, in their entirety, all of their
contractual ties with Google.
16.

thirty

The special telephone "listens in on" ten seconds of the user's surroundings every

seconds,

according

to

IMMI.

IMMI,

How

It

Works,

http://www.immi.comdataClctn.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2009). It also uses a special Bluetooth beacon technology to determine whether the user is at home or not, helping IMMI
interpret the information it overhears. Id.
17. See IMMI, Recruitment, http://www.immi.conrecruitment.html (last visited Jan. 4,
2009) (noting 96% user retention rates).
18. See Google, Terms of Service §§ 2, 7, http://www.google.com/accounts/TOS (last
visited Jan. 4, 2009).
19. See id. at § 2.2(B).
20. See id. at § 13.
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Of course, the argument that the user assents to a contract or
series of contracts merely by using Google's software or services is
22
a sound one. 21 The user's acceptance of the terms is effective,
even though the agreement is complex and may operate to the
user's detriment by compromising his privacy after he begins using Google's services. 23 A technically unsophisticated user, however, probably will not appreciate the quantity 24 of privacy sacrificed by using Google's services, 25 nor the privacy infringement
that continues long after 26 use of Google's services ceases.
One might argue that the user should copy 27 the terms of
Google's privacy agreement into a separate document or, alternatively, print the document. However, the Google tools likely to be
most harmful to the user's privacy (such as Google Toolbar, which
monitors the user's activities when the user's Web browser is
open) disable the cut-and-paste and print functions when the
terms of the privacy agreement are displayed. 28 This limitation
21. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996) (formation of
contract may occur by use of software by user, separate from any purchase); U.C.C. §§ 2204(1), 602(1), 606(1) (2003).
22. Consistency around the efficacy of agreements such as these has, itself, a societal
and commercial value attributed to it. See 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON
CONTRACTS § 4.26 (3d ed. 1990).
23. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) (complex terms on
reverse of cruise tickets accepted upon passenger's use of ticket to secure passage on cruise
ship); Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. MV Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528 (1995) (holding
similarly as to bills of lading); Liverpool & G.W. Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 397,
437-38 (1889) (noting tendency to accept nearly any terms appurtenant to receipts and bills
of lading due to pressures of commerce).
24. See Tom Mighell, Taking Control of Your Internet Research: New Tools Help Manage the Chaos, 68 TEX. B.J. 680, 681 (2005) (discussing how easily a user could inadvertently disclose a greater quantity of sensitive information than intended while using Google
tools).
25. This is particularly true in cases where the services provided by Google are "transparent" to the user. For instance, Google's management of a local section of the power grid.
See M. Wald and M. Helft, Google Taking a Step Into Power Metering, N.Y. TIMES, February
10,
2009,
at
B9,
available
at,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/1O/technology/companies/lOgrid.html?th&emc--th.
26. See Jason Isaac Miller, Note, "Don'tBe Evil" Gmail's Relevant Text Advertisements
Violate Google's Own Motto and Your E-Mail Privacy Rights, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1607,
1614 n.30 (2005) (noting Google's potentially perpetual retention of personal data gathered
regarding users of Google's Gmail service).
27. There is a long tradition of giving the assenting offeree a tangible copy of the
agreement he or she entered into. See generally Foster v. Mansfield, C. & L. M. R. Co., 146
U.S. 88 (1892) (offeree given copy of contract as matter of course); U.S.United States v.
Jamison, 31 Cust. Ct. 468, 469 (1953) (Mexican manufacturer doing business with American importer in 1945 given copy of contract); Indep. Coop. Milk Producers Assn. v. Comm'r
of Int'l Revenue, 76 T.C. 1001, 1003 n.3 (1981) (offeror sent letter to each offeree, stating, "I
am enclosing a copy of your contract for your records.").
28. See
Google,
Google
Toolbar
Download,
http://toolbar.google.comIT5/intl/en/index.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2009) and subsequent
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effectively guarantees that most users are unable to generate a
complete record of their contracts with Google.
This scenario, where the user must assent to the contract with
Google immediately upon using the service, is not unique. Take,
for instance, the Lloyd's Open Form ("LOF'). The LOF is a contract that maritime salvage outfits ("salvor(s)") use to tie their
compensation to the degree of success they enjoy in saving a
ship. 29 In a typical situation, a salvor might arrive at the scene of
a sinking ship, hand the ship's captain an LOF, and say, "If you
sign this, we'll undertake with best efforts to save your ship. If
not, good luck."30 Like the Google users, few captains would take
time on the deck of their sinking ships to read the fine print (for
instance, the oft-disputed arbitration clauses incorporated by reference on the most-often-used version of the form) 31 of the LOF.
Unlike Google's users, however, at least the captains have a copy
of the LOF to review later.
IV. MERE BROKER OR MARKET MAKER?
Anyone reviewing Google's business will quickly realize that
Google is in the business of both buying and selling privacy. However, the underlying transactions are, somewhat counterintuitively, quite complex. Google first "buys" the user's privacy, usually through privacy-for-services barter arrangements as described previously. It then sells AdWords 32 at auction, 33 allowing
installation screens concerning various browsers and installation information. See also
Michael R. Greenlee, Affect of UETA, UCITA, and E-Signature Legislation on Exchange
and ASP Agreements, 650 PLI/PAT 271, 287 (2001) (noting that when a user clicks "install
the Google Toolbar," Google displays the terms of privacy arrangement but does not allow
the user to save or print the contract he or she has agreed to).
29. See THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY & MARITIME LAW § 16-6 (4th ed. 2004).
30. Many cases involve this fact pattern, or a rushed signing of the LOF under equally
dire circumstances. See, e.g., Jackson v. Costa Lines, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 393, 395-96 (S.D.
Fla. 1980) (court taking notice that parties executed valid LOF while vessel was in peril).
31. See
Lloyd's
Standard
Form
of Salvage
Agreement,
available at
http://www.lloyds.com/NR/rdonlyres/BAD28C38-D79F-4065-8BDF37FD59119BAB/0/AgencyLOF2000.pdf.
32. AdWords have already generated a stream of lawsuits. An excellent explanation of
how AdWords might become part of one's advertising campaign appears in Hysitron Inc. v.
MTS Systems Corp., No. Civ. 07-01533 ADMJAJB, 2008 WL 3161969, at *1 (D. Minn. Aug.
1, 2008):
After Hysitron began use of its HYSITRON trademark, MTS, as part of its internet
marketing strategy, purchased the term "hysitron" to generate a sponsored link
through Google, Inc.'s... AdWords program. When a user types a term into Google
or another internet search engine, the search engine provides links to websites that
include the term searched. Search engines produce two types of links: sponsored and
organic. Organic links are generated when the user keys in a term that matches data
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advertisers to reach the user based upon what Google has learned
about the user's private attributes. These AdWords auctions are
not a reselling of the user's privacy itself, but rather the sale of a
"privacy derivative" 34 of sorts, an option that allows the advertiser
to invest in Google's appraisal of the customer's wants and needs.
In other words, the advertiser is not buying the user's privacy itself, nor is Google simply reselling it.
V. THE OTHER GOOGLETRACT

Google's contracts with advertisers vary, but they essentially
provide that an advertiser will pay an auction rate price for an
option, which allows the advertiser to communicate with Mr. Doe,
and others similar to Mr. Doe, based upon certain information
gathered while Mr. Doe's privacy was temporarily compromised or
contractually abated by The First Googletract, discussed previously.
35
In this context, the contract is described as an option contract
because this term most aptly describes how it might be priced.
However, because the contracts have no market liquidity, they do
not behave like market-rate options. Instead, they are individually auctioned 36 by Google.
In essence, Google operates an auction market to price options
by what it has determined to be likely outcomes, based upon data
it has gathered about individual users.3 7 Via this market, advertisers bid for the opportunity to be affiliated with AdWords. 38 By

from a website. In contrast, a sponsored link is generated when a user keys in a term
that an advertiser has purchased. When the user keys in the purchased term, the
search engine generates a link to whatever content the advertiser desires. These
sponsored links are typically displayed above or to the side of organic links.
Id. at *1 (citations omitted).
33. See Viacom Int'l Inc. v. YouTube Inc., 253 F.R.D. 256, 263 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) ("Google
earns most of its revenue from fees it charges advertisers to display advertisements.").
34. A "derivative" means "a financial instrument whose value depends on or is derived
from the performance of a secondary source such as an underlying bond, currency, or commodity." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 374 (8th ed. 2004).
35. For an examination of the legal calculus required to determine whether a contract
is properly classified, generally, as an option contract, see Dynamics Corp. of America v.
United States, 389 F.2d 424 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
36. Person v. Google, Inc., No. C 06-7297 JF (RS), 2007 WL 832941, at *2 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 16, 2007) ("Google auctions these keywords to potential advertisers and charges the
auction winner when a user clicks on the sponsored link.') (citations omitted).

37.

Sajjad Matin, Note, Clicks Ahoy! Navigating Online Advertising in a Sea of Fraudu-

lent Clicks, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 533, 547-49 (2007).
38. See DAVID A. VISE & MARK MAISEED, THE GOOGLE STORY 88-90 (Bantam Dell

2005).
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becoming affiliated with certain AdWords, the advertiser becomes
more visible to certain Google users.
The question arises of whether privacy has a uniform market
price or whether the value of privacy varies from consumer to consumer. The canon of law surrounding trade secrets suggests that
privacy can be individually priced in the commercial market. 39
The question of whether the partial compromise of the privacy of a
given person can be accurately priced leads to a more basic philosophical question.
VI. INCREASING PRIVACY: PRODUCTION OR PRESERVATION?
This fundamental question has troubled philosophers for centuries: Are people's actions fundamentally public and selectively
made private, or are the actions fundamentally private and occasionally shared? In other words, is the natural state of the world a
series of spheres of privacy 40 or an uninterrupted channel of publicity?
The common law seems to support an interpretation that anything that is not public is private. 41 Within this binary determination, people may arrange to make their private facts and affairs
public in exchange for money or services. For instance, a person
may choose to publish a memoir 42 or license the rights to his or her
43
life story.
In the context of property law, one customarily discusses information rather than privacy. Some would argue that information
is generally public, with sections of information made private
through copyrights, trade secrets, and other measures. 44 But in
39. See Niemi v. NHK Spring Co., 543 F.3d 294, 299 (6th Cir. 2008) (noting that value
of trade secrets is "not readily ascertainable" but also not impossible to ascertain).
40. Privacy, as used in this discussion, refers to the ability to exert control over information about oneself, not privacy in the broader "decision-making" Griswold sense. For an
eloquent discussion of this distinction, see Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
41. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652(d) (1976); Fry v. Ionia SentinelStandard, 300 N.W.2d 687 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980); Beard v. Akzona, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 128
(E.D. Tenn. 1981).
42. Some states have drafted laws that restrict this freedom to contract, usually under
only a very narrow set of circumstances. See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAW. § 632-a (McKinney 1982
& Supp. 1991).
43. See, e.g., In re Lorraine Brooke Assoc., Inc., No. 07-12641-BKC-AJC, 2007 WL
2257608, at *2 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Aug. 2, 2007) (debtor in bankruptcy transferred license
covering his "intellectual property rights, consisting among other things, of [debtorl']'s
name, facsimile signature, nickname, likeness, life story, right of publicity and auto biographical sketch" to creditor-publisher).
44. See, e.g., Michael E. Levine, Airline Competition in Deregulated Markets: Theory,
Firm Strategy, and PublicPolicy, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 393, 451 (1987).
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the realm of personal information, privacy is the more interesting
commodity. Unlike information, privacy is, by definition, not in45
herently public.
Voting, for example, is typically private until made public. A
person may vote in private but then upon leaving the polling place
may disclose to an exit pollster how he or she voted 4 6 (or just as
easily may refuse to answer the exit poll or even attempt to affirmatively mislead the pollster).
None of these examples, however, deal with the transmutation
of privacy into metadata and the control that Google exerts over
the market for this metadata. Some users consider pieces of information such as Internet searches, sites visited, and communications with other Internet users to be private, 47 even after they
48
have contracted away their privacy rights in this information.
Many users voiced privacy concerns after Google's Gmail service
began displaying ads triggered by the content of e-mails the users
had sent and received. 49 It would seem, from Google's actions,
that Google views all personal information as fundamentally public and eligible for "harvesting." The various contracts between
Google and the user, then, are less an arrangement to barter privacy for services and more a mechanism for reducing the risks 5° of
the harvest.
VII. FROM BOUNTY TO SCARCITY: PRIVACY'S ENDGAME
"Google... will be the [company] to test the limits of what society can tolerate." 5' 1
Some readers will undoubtedly recall the 1964 James Bond
blockbuster Goldfinger about a plan to blow up Fort Knox in the
45. "[P]ri va, cy \pri-v-s&\ n, pl -cies (15c) 1 a: the quality or state of being apart
MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE
from company or observation: SECLUSION"
DICTIONARY 927 (10th ed. 1998).
46. Exit polling has increasingly become part of the American electoral process, as the
Supreme Court noted in Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 222 (1992).
47. In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 503 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(quoting the plaintiffs complaint at 38).
48. This is supported by research showing that better than one-quarter of all Internet
searches are designed to produce pornographic results, suggesting that users likely expect
some degree of privacy as to their searching. See Supplemental Declaration of Philip B.
Stark, Ph.D. § 4, Gonzales v. Google, Inc., 234 F.R.D. 674 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (No. mc-8000622) (citing Vise & Malseed, supra note 38, at 165).
49. See Saul Hansell, Advertisers Trace Paths Users Leave on the Internet, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 15, 2006, at C1.
50. 'Risks" here refers chiefly to litigation risks.
51. Who's Afraid of Google, ECONOMIST, Aug. 30, 2007.
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hope of increasing gold prices by reducing its supply. Can Google,
by comparison, manipulate the "supply" of privacy? ? Would decreasing the amount of privacy available increase the price people
are willing to pay to preserve what little of their privacy remains?

52

To use another metaphor, suppose that one visualizes the
amount of privacy in the world as a forest, 53 with Google as the
dominant logging company. 54 The forest would diminish proportionately with the pace of logging operations. 55 The cleared areas
56
would eventually regenerate, but this process would take time.
Extending this metaphor, one could liken corporate, industry,
legislative, policy, or judicial privacy protection measures to environmental protection measures protecting a forest.5

7

Like envi-

ronmental protection measures, they would be likely to have unintended second-order effects. 58 Outright control of the quantity of
52. For a discussion of user attitudes about privacy, see Nathaniel Good et al., User
Choices and Regret: UnderstandingUsers' Decision ProcessAbout Consensually Acquired
Spyware, 2 IS: J. L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. Soc'Y 283, 293 (2006).
53. For a historical perspective on scarcity and preservation issues, see PETER BLICKLE,
THE REVOLUTION OF 1525: THE GERMAN PEASANTS' WAR FROM A NEW PERSPECTIVE 68-81
(Thomas A. Brady, Jr., & H.C. Erik Midelfort trans., Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1985)
(1981). For an economic perspective on modeling scarcity and its effects on actors, see
Harold Hotelling, The Economics of Exhaustible Resources, 39 J. POL. ECON. (NUMBER 2)
137, 137-175 (1931).
54. It is interesting to examine this harvest analogy in view of recent work done by
Theodore Panayotou and others on growth versus scarcity and damage, particularly if the
privacy economy is viewed as a subset of difficult-to-measure transactions within the information economy. See Theodore Panayotou, Economic Growth and the Environment (Ctr.
for Int'l Dev. at Harvard Univ., Working Paper No. 56, 2000), available at
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidwp/pdf/056.pdf.
55. No one disputes that privacy is becoming scarcer with or without Google. See generally Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness,and
Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149 (2008). But, most agree that
Google is accelerating privacy's extinction. See Nikhil S. Palekar, Note, Privacy Protection:
When is 'Adequate" Actually Adequate?, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 549, 568-69 (2008).
Ask.com, for instance, maintains substantially less personal data than Google. Miguel
Helft, Ask.com Puts a Bet on Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2007, at C1.
56. Similarly, once a user's data are harvested, their privacy may grow back as the
person's harvested data become stale and less valuable to marketers. For example, the
user may obtain new employment, begin using a different e-mail address, mailing address,
or telephone number, or become interested in minivans rather than sports cars.
57. Posner made a similar argument roughly twenty-five years ago, arguing that the
personal interests safeguarded by privacy protections are problematic and economically
inefficient for many of the same reasons environmental safeguards are often economically
nonsensical. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (Harvard Univ. Press 2d ed.
1981). Others have argued that privacy is an improvised, inadequate legal doctrine that
cannot stand by itself. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (Simon & Schuster 1990).
58. For a detailed explanation of what positive and negative effects might result from
various levels of privacy safeguards, see F. SCHOEMAN, PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF
PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY (Cambridge Univ. Press 1984).
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privacy available in the marketplace would be very unlikely to
succeed, as its production and consumption could not be directly
managed.
Like any other commodity, as the supply of privacy decreases,
59
the costs of harvesting the remaining privacy will increase.
Eventually, the supply curve will shift left to account for the increasing marginal cost. Similarly, the cost to contractually obtain
the privacy of the first thousand, million, or ten million users
might be very small (merely allowing them use of Gmail or the
Google Toolbar, for instance). 60 The cost to access the otherwise
private information of the hundred-millionth, five-hundredmillionth, or billionth user, by comparison, may be incrementally
higher. 6 1 The value of that privacy may be higher, too. The value
of unharvested privacy must increase 62 at the common rate of return on similar assets. 63 Hence, when visualizing yet-to-beharvested units of privacy, one must consider privacy to be a finite
resource in which "the value of [an unharvested unit] is also the
present value of future sales from it, after deduction of [the cost to
of
obtain the unit, thus] resource owners must expect the net price
64
the [unharvested commodity] to be increasing exponentially[.]"

59. Much theoretical work has been done in this area, primarily in determining when
maintaining the extraction of oil from the earth will be physically impossible. See, e.g.,
ANDREI BAZHANOV, THE PEAK OF OIL EXTRACTION AND A MODIFIED MAXIMIN PRINCIPLE
(2006), available at, http://mpra.ub-uni-muenchen.de/1671/1/mpra.paper-1671.pdf.).
60. While these Google services had some initial fixed research and development costs
associated with them, the marginal cost to Google of giving away a one-gigabyte Gmail email account is likely very close to zero. In addition, the size and structure of the account
discourages deletions, thus preserving the data and the user's classifications. See NATALYA
YEZHKOVA, WORLDWIDE DISK STORAGE SYSTEMS 2008-2012 FORECAST: CONTENT-CENTRIC
CUSTOMERS -- RESHAPING MARKET DEMAND App. 6 (2008).
61. Because Internet usage is skewed toward a first-world, global-north audience, it
may be that the three-billionth user, for instance, is worth less to Google than the billionth
user, but costs more to harvest. This argument, that eventually the trees remaining in the
forest are the least valuable ones, is a valid thought experiment, but is not the hypothesis
presented here.
62. This theory may be untrue for users in the developing world. See the market dichotomy illustrated infra.
63. This value is difficult to monetize, as it is difficult to know what the common rate of
return or interest rate would be for the risk class that "privacy" occupies. It is unclear, as a
result, whether a Hotelling-Solow equilibrium exists in a market like the one in privacy
theorized in this Article.
64. Robert M. Solow, The Economics of Resources or the Resources of Economics, 64 AM.
ECON. REV. (ISSUE1, 2) 1 (1974).
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Exhibit A. Harvesting the Developed World.
GOOGLES HARVEST STRATEGY:
STARTING WITH THE
MAINSTREAI

CURRENT
HARVEST

SO - Standard Devlation
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-

Future generations are unlikely to enjoy anything greater than
today's degree of privacy so, for the sake of argument, one could
set the finite, "starting" amount of privacy available equal to today's quantity.65 Google has an effective monopoly over harvesting privacy that it will likely be able to maintain. 66 It is likely,
then, that Google would use a species of monopoly finite-resource

65. For an idea of how future generations' relationships governed by privacy policies
might affect the future of privacy, see Corey A. Ciocchetti, E-Commerce and Information
Privacy: Privacy Policies as Personal Information Protectors, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 55, 92-98
(2007).
66. Monopoly here refers to a functional monopoly state of market dominance when one
considers a Herfindahl-Hirschman-style sum-of-squares analysis of Google's market position as to privacy. This is not the basis on which the Department of Justice scrutinized
Google's deal with DoubleClick, however. Note also that one reaches a substantially different conclusion if one defines Google's market concentration footprint traditionally, as
"Internet ad spending," for instance (HHI of 650). See David Cohen, The Portal Myth,
CLICKZ, Sept. 15, 2004, http://www.clickz.com/3407171. Seen in this context of privacy
rather than advertising, any merger between Google and any moderately successful, similar firm would raise the HHI (concentration) of the market by more than 100 points and, as
a result, presumptively raise antitrust concerns in the privacy market. See The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/testimonylhhi.htm (last visited Jan.
25, 2009).
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calculation 67 that estimated its revenue to be very close to total
68
industry revenue.
Until the number of users successfully recruited reaches a very
high value, the marginal cost of harvesting additional privacy is
likely to be near zero. By manipulating auction rules and, to the
extent allowable by law, auction outcomes, 69 Google will be able to
maintain, or even increase, its reference price spread.7 0 Over
time, this scheme will allow Google to manage the market in privacy throughout the developed world very profitably, if not sustainably.

67. Examining which calculations might portray the value of a "privacy monopoly" is
the next logical step from Posner's thinking in this area that predated Google's success by
two decades. See Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Privacy, 71 AMER. ECON. REV.
(ISSUE 2) 405-08 (1981).
68. In other words, Google would likely look to an "eat the whole pie" calculation,
rather than slicing and dicing the area beneath the demand curve.
69. There is pending litigation over whether Google can expand the auction market for
trademarked and copyrighted terms. For instance, Google could get a higher auction price
for the words "American Airlines" if United Airlines were allowed to bid on those words at
auction. As the number of potential suitors for any given word combination increases, the
median winning bid for any given set of contested combinations would presumably increase
superlinearly. By engineering the number of participants in a given auction and the rules
under which they partake in the auction, Google can presumably engineer the auction's
ending value with some degree of accuracy.
70. Reference price spread is a net expression used in auctions of closing auction price,
less fees or costs attributable to third parties triggered by the close of the auction, less
marginal cost. SOTHEBY'S GUIDE TO MODERN AUCTIONS 208-11 (9th ed.).
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Exhibit B. Beyond the Low-Hanging Fruit.
MAXIMUM PRIVACY HARVEST

50%

GOOGLE'S DEVELOPING
WORLD HARVEST

0%
t

The maximum useful privacy harvest, for the foreseeable future,
is placed at above 50% but substantially below 75% of the developing world's population. Many populations will be willing to trade
their privacy for Google's services, 71 but exploration of that privacy
will not yield substantial returns because of government interference (China), insufficient marketing utility associated with the
resulting information (much of sub-Saharan Africa), insufficient
demographic and other sympathetic datasets, and other problems.
Some populations will remain too geographically remote, too often
engaged in armed conflict, or too distant from the rule of law to
partake in the privacy-for-services bargain. Still others will face
challenges such as illiteracy or niche languages that will make
their privacy unharvestable or of substantially limited economic
value if harvested.

71. C. Nicholson, Bringing the Internet to Remote African Villages, NY Times, February
2,
2009
at
B4,
available
at,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/02/technology/internet/02kenya.html?th&emc--th.
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VIII. EASTER ISLAND ECONOMICS
72
"Why, then, can one desire too much of a good thing?"

One can also visualize the fundamental question as one of equilibrium--optimizing a preservation interest against a production
interest. Consider the following table showing a variety of production possibilities 73 for the Rapanui 74 civilization:
Table Alpha.
Preservation
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The basic functioning of any society at the Rapanui level of
technological advancement will require some utilization of available lumber resources. However, the erection of moai statues
proved a particularly resource-intensive activity for the Rapanui.
In Table Alpha, supra, tree preservation falls off superlinearly
against moai erection, as incrementally more moai erection causes
disproportionately more deforestation. Also, the negative hydrologic and soil implications of deforestation tend to accelerate fur76
ther tree loss.
There is, however, a sustainable 77 rate at which the Rapanui
civilization could have utilized lumber and erected moai statues
without completely exhausting its forestry resources. The problem, of course, is finding a production horizon at which sustainable management of the underlying resources remains possible.

72.
73.
74.
75.
Island.

WILLIAM SHAKEsPEARE, As You LIKE IT act 4, sc. 1.
Values chosen are arbitrary and for illustration purposes only.
Rapanui (alternatively, Rapa Nui) is a native Polynesian culture and ethnic group.
Moai are monolithic human figures found on Rapa Nui, better known as Easter

76. See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-Generalon Programme Element
II.d(i), Matters Left Pending and Other Issues Arising from the ProgrammeElements of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Forests Process, Issues That Need Further Clarification: Underlying Causes of Deforestationand Forest Degradation,delivered to the Intergovernmental
Forum on Forests, U.N. Doc. EICN.17/IFF/1999/7 (Feb. 24, 1999), available at,
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/050/71/PDFN9905071.pdf?OpenElement.
77. For a general discussion of sustainability in this context see Petra Campbell, Easter
Island: A Path to Sustainable Development, 22 RAPA NUI J. (NUMBER 1) 48, 48-53 (2008);
available at, http://www.islandheritage.org/rnj.html.
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One could create a similar table representing the trade-off between the amount of privacy preserved and the number of people
in privity of contract with Google. As a higher percentage of the
world's population contracts to barter its privacy for Google's services, the worldwide amount of privacy eligible for preservation
declines.
Table Beta.
Privacy Preservation (%)
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Just as a grove of palms on Easter Island is more likely to survive than a single tree, the impact of a contract with Google is not
78
wholly individual or insulated. This trend of "collateral damage"
to a group's privacy interests can be seen in the following table.
Consider, for example, a group of ten friends who use e-mail to
communicate with one another. The following table describes
what might happen to the privacy preservation within the group
as individuals within the group begin to use Gmail, a service that
requires the user to agree that Google may read all e-mails sent or
received.
Table Gamma.
Privacy Preservation(%)
Friends on Gmail (#/10)

100
0

75
1

50
2

20
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10
6

0 01 0
8 9 10

Note that in the scenario where two individuals in the group
have not entered into a contract with Google, the entire group's
privacy is compromised because a critical mass has been reached
among the counterparts to the various e-mail messages. Therefore, Google can compromise the privacy of a group completely
without the entire group's assent. From an economic perspective,
the individuals contributing information to Google without assenting to the Gmail contract are a collateral benefit.
Google's services, Gmail and Google Talk 79 for instance, rely
upon both singular decisions and pairs of participants. One per78. "Collateral Damage" means "injury inflicted on something other than an intended
target."
Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary (Retrieved
March
16,
2009),
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary.com/dictionary/collateraldamage.
79. Google Talk is Google's brand-name instant messaging application.
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son might assent to a bargain that exchanges a measure of privacy
for a specific set of services. If a pair of people uses Gmail, each
has assented to such a bargain, and all e-mail messages between
the two will be monitored with their consent. However, if a pair of
people, only one of whom uses Gmail, converses via e-mail, each
exchange will be monitored by Google as though each had consented. The aggregate deleterious effect on the privacy of the
group is many times that of the Gmail-to-Gmail correspondences.
Presuming that individuals who accept Google's terms do so
knowingly, the subsequent limitations placed upon their privacy
are not particularly problematic. Hence, pairs of people where
each is a Gmail user cause little collateral damage. Meanwhile,
pairs in which one correspondent uses Gmail, while the other does
not, present a problematic scenario. It is through these scenarios-millions of them-that Google has extended its reach beyond
any limitations of privity. This bleed of information from individuals who have not accepted Google's bargain are a collateral
harvest for Google's network.
IX. CONCLUSION
Google pans for data in streams of information and looks for
patterns in the bits it gathers. Google's core business, over the
long term, is pricing and monetizing the privacy rights of the
world's citizens by acquiring the right to prospect in otherwiseinaccessible areas and to sell option contracts related to the patterns it finds. Just as the clarity of a digital photograph is dependent on the number and accuracy of the pixels of which it is
comprised, so the value of Google's product is dependent on a constant stream of more and more specific data. The clearer Google's
picture of our lives becomes, the more invasive the next step of
data gathering will become. Whether society's relationship with
Google is durable enough to bear the trade-offs required for a
market rooted in the harvest and sale of privacy to function is a
question whose answer will not be apparent for years, or decades,
to come.

